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INCREASING LAPSES IN DATA SECURITY:
THE NEED FOR A COMMON ANSWER TOWHAT
CONSTITUTES STANDING IN A DATA BREACH
CONTEXT
Aaron Benjamin Edelman*
A liberal application of standing doctrine in the data breach context
will create stronger preventative protections to personal
information and provide remedies should those protections fail.
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, individuals and entities in the United States fell victim
to the greatest number of data breaches in statistical history.
1
Data
breaches are difficult to both define and enumerate. In the United
States, each state has enacted legislation which requires “private or
governmental entities to notify individuals about security breaches
of personally identifiable information.”
2
Each of these data breach
notification laws defines, to varying degrees of inclusivity, what a
data breach is under that state’s code, enumerates what personal
information falls within its scope such that the putting at risk of that
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2020; B.B.A, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2017. Thank you to my parents and siblings for providing an
overwhelming amount of support and encouragement in everything I do.
Additionally, thank you to each and every member of the Journal of Law& Policy
for the insight and counsel that made this Note possible.
1
J. Clement, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the
United States from 2005 to 2018 (in millions), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breaches-recorded-in-the-united-
states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/ (last updated Aug. 5, 2019).
2
Security Breach Notification Laws, NSCL (Sept. 29, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
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information qualifies as a data breach,
3
determines which
institutions are subject to compliance with the law,
4
sets out
requirements for notice,
5
and provides exemptions.
6
Public
disclosure of data breaches, while expected and often required of
compromised institutions by state data breach notification laws, is
not done every time a breach occurs, so with that understanding,
only publicly available information can form the basis of these
statistics. In 2018, “[h]acking was the most common form of data
breach[;]”
7
hacking is defined by Merriam-Webster as “an act or
instance of gaining or attempting to gain illegal access to a computer
3
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 210-1347 (2005).
“Personal information” means an individual’s first name, or first
initial, and last name in combination with any one or more of the
following data elements, when either the name or the data elements
are not encrypted or redacted: A. [s]ocial security number; B.
[d]river’s license number or state identification card number;
C. [a]ccount number, credit card number or debit card number, if
circumstances exist wherein such a number could be used without
additional identifying information, access codes or passwords; D.
[a]ccount passwords or personal identification numbers or other
accesscodes;orE. [a]nyof thedataelements contained inparagraphs
A to D when not in connection with the individual’s first name, or
first initial, and last name, if the information if compromised would
be sufficient to permit a person to fraudulently assume or attempt to
assume the identity of the person whose information was
compromised.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
4
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202 (West 2019). “A person who owns or
licenses computerized data that includes personal information concerning a Utah
resident” is subject to the law. Id. § 13-44-202 (1)(a).
5
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2019). Notice is required to residents or persons
doing business in the state if “illegal use of the information has occurred or is reasonably
likely to occur or use of the information creates a material risk of harm” to the person or
business. An exemption to notice is when disclosure would “impede[] a criminal
investigation.” Id. § 39-1-90 (B)–(D)(1).
6
Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 2.
7
IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 2
(2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-
End-of-Year-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf. Other forms of data
breaches include human error, and theft, or loss of a device. Id. at 10.
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or computer system.”
8
While each state’s code defines what a breach
is in various ways, generally speaking, all statutes cover some form
of unauthorized acquisition of personal information.
9
Hacking by
Merriam-Webster’s definition falls into the direct ambit of what data
breach notification laws target.
10
Hacking’s large role in data
breaches is concerning because hackers generally obtain stolen
information to use in fraudulent activity.
11
In 2016, hackers
breached the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) data retrieval tool,
which parents used to transfer financial information for their
college-bound children applying for federal aid; the hackers stole
thirty million dollars from the IRS after posing as college students
to obtain fraudulent tax refunds.
12
Furthermore, there is no
indication that the number of data breaches which come about as a
result of hacking is likely to decline in the near future, as evidenced
by the over 1,244 publicly reported data breaches in 2018—a
dramatic increase from the mere 157 known data breaches in 2005.
13
The growing threat of data breaches is further evidenced by the fact
that the number of reported breaches in 2019 is up 56.4%, and the
number of exposed records is up 28.9% from the first quarter of
2018.
14
8
Definition of Hack, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hack (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
9
See generally Jennifer J. Hennessy et al., State Data Breach Notification
Laws, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (July 1, 2019),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/01/state-data-breach-
notification-laws (citing to an internal State Date Breach Notification Laws Chart,
which includes a definition of personal information for each state).
10
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.171 (2019) (defining a security breach as “the
unauthorized access of data in electronic form containing personal information”);
Definition of Hack, supra note 8.
11
See What Do Hackers DoWith Your Stolen Identity?, TRENDMICRO (June
21, 2017), https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-
digital-threats/what-do-hackers-do-with-your-stolen-identity.
12
Alfred Ng, Hackers Use College Student Loans Tool to Steal $30 Million,
CNET (Apr. 7, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/hackers-used-
college-student-loans-tool-to-steal-30-million/.
13
J. Clement, supra note 1.
14
Data Breach Trends in 2019, SECURITY MAG. (May 8, 2019),
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/90207-data-breach-trends-in-2019.
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The value of personal information in the modern digital world
makes it a highly coveted asset for hackers and other nefarious
parties. Hackers often target personally identifiable information,
which (depending on state definitions) frequently includes sensitive
financial and healthcare information.
15
This stolen information can
be used, for instance, to take out loans, make fraudulent credit card
transactions, and fill prescriptions illegally.
16
Once stolen, hackers
typically turn to underground markets such as those on the dark web
to sell the stolen data.
17
The data is then either sold individually, in
bulk, or in a bundle of various types of stolen information.
18
Affected by this growing underground market for stolen
information, United States citizens continue to fall victim to
hundreds of thousands of reported cases of identity theft.
19
Victims of data breaches frequently turn to the law as a
remedy.
20
In 2018, “5.7% of data breaches publicly reported led to
15
What Do Hackers Do With Your Stolen Identity?, supra note 11.
16
Id.
17
Id.; see Ellen Sirull, What is the Dark Web?, EXPERION (Apr. 8, 2018),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-the-dark-web/ (“The dark
web isn’t an actual place, but rather a hidden network of websites.”); see also
Brian Stack, Here’s How Much Your Personal Information is Selling For On The
Dark Web, EXPERION (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-
experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-
web/ (“After a data breach or hacking incident, personal information is often
bought and sold on the dark web by identity thieves looking to make money off
your good name—and any numbers or information associated with you.”).
18
Stack, supra note 17.
19
See Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrimes, INS. INFO. INST.
(2019), https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-
cybercrime (“The Consumer Sentinel Network, maintained by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), tracks consumer fraud and identity theft complaints that have
been filed with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and private
organizations.”). In 2018, there were 444,602 identity theft complaints, whereas
in 2016 there were 398,952 identity complaints. Id.
20
See, e.g., In re SuperValu Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 773 (8th Cir. 2017); Attias
v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores,
Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 277–78
(4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–89
(6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th
Cir. 2015) (demonstrating various instances wherein victims of data breaches filed
lawsuits against entities responsible for protecting their personal information).
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class action litigation[,] . . . indicating a steady increase in class
action litigation relative to the number of breaches.”
21
This increase
in litigation will likely continue as hackers target personal
information, recognizing its market value.
22
Many potential
plaintiffs who suffered as victims of data breaches, however, find
themselves in limbo regarding the issue of standing before a court
because of a significant split amongst the federal circuit courts.
23
Thus, while victims of data breaches oftentimes have their personal
information fall into the hands of nefarious characters who intend to
use the information to the victims’ detriment, that may not be
enough to provide victims a right to sue in federal court because of
disparate interpretations of standing that create impediments to data
breach litigation.
24
Standing is a determination of whether or not someone has
grounds to bring suit based on the contextual reading of Article III
of the United States Constitution.
25
Article III, which governs
federal courts, places a limit on the judiciary and dictates that federal
courts can only hear “cases” and “controversies” that are
21
DAVID ZETOONY ET AL., 2019 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 2
(2019), https://www.bclplaw.com/images/content/1/6/v6/163774/2019-
Litigation-Report.pdf [hereinafter ZETOONY ET AL., 2019 DATA BREACH
LITIGATION REPORT].
22
See DAVID ZETOONY ET AL., 2017 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 8
(2017), https://www.bclplaw.com/images/content/9/6/v2/96690/Bryan-Cave-
Data-Breach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf [hereinafter ZETOONY ET AL.,
2017 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT].
23
See, e.g., In re SuperValu Inc., 870 F.3d at 773; Attias, 865 F.3d at 629;
Whalen, 689 F. App’x 89; Beck, 848 F.3d at 277–78; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at
387–89 (showing how various circuits have reached differing conclusions on the
standard for establishing standing for victims of data breaches).
24
See, e.g., In re SuperValu Inc., 870 F.3d at 773; Attias, 865 F.3d at 629;
Whalen, 689 F. App’x 89; Beck, 848 F.3d at 277–78; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at
387–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690 (exhibiting how the absence of
a uniform rule evaluating standing in a data breach context, with respect to the
harm suffered by plaintiffs, will continue to create conflicting results and
uncertainty amongst plaintiffs as to whether their harms are redressable).
25
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)) (“[T]he core component of standing is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
III.”); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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“traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”
26
The standing requirements have been broken down into: (1) an
injury in fact, (2) redressability, and (3) a causal connection between
the injury suffered and the matter brought into court.
27
An injury in
fact is a harm that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent.”
28
Therefore, an injury cannot be “conjectural or
hypothetical.”
29
However, a harm suffered is not limited to physical
harms; it includes violations of personal rights.
30
The injury in fact
must also be redressable in that courts must have the ability to offer
a remedy for the injury sustained.
31
Finally, the injury suffered must
have a causal connection to the matter brought into court—the injury
must be “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the
defendant.
32
As these factors leave room for interpretation on a case-
by-case basis, a uniform determination of standing is increasingly
necessary as data breach litigation has become more commonplace,
accompanied by an increased number of victims facing an
impediment to recourse in the legal system.
33
In a data breach context, plaintiffs typically file a data breach
suit when they entrust a person or entity with personally identifiable
information (such as social security numbers, credit card
information, home address, or different combinations of personally
identifiable information as enumerated on a state-by-state basis) and
a third party steals that information.
34
Plaintiffs often sue the trusted
entity that failed to protect their personal information based on a
potential future harm that may occur because of lackluster
26
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
28
Id. at 560.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 564 n.2.
31
Id. at 561.
32
Id. at 560.
33
See ZETOONY ETAL., 2017DATABREACHLITIGATIONREPORT, supra note
22, at 2 (“[P]laintiffs continue to face [difficulty] establishing that they were
injured by a breach and, therefore, have standing as a matter of law to bring suit.”).
34
See Data Breach Lawsuit, CLASS ACTION.COM,
https://www.classaction.com/data-breach/lawsuit/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2018).
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security.
35
If third party hackers use the stolen information against a
plaintiff, there is a stronger case for standing because a concrete and
easily elucidated harm has been suffered.
36
However, in cases where
the alleged harm is a future harm—where plaintiffs plead a
“certainly impending” injury or a substantial risk of injury—circuits
are split as to what constitutes an “injury in fact” and when to find a
causal connection between the theft and future harm.
37
The split
makes it unclear if plaintiffs have suffered an “injury in fact” at the
time when their personal information is stolen or if victims of the
breach must wait until that stolen information is used to their
detriment.
38
As data breaches and data breach litigation become more
common, it is increasingly important that courts establish a uniform
application of the standing doctrine.
39
In the first three months of
2019, approximately two billion data records are known to have
been compromised worldwide—a drastic increase in stolen records
from 2018 when five billion data records were compromised in the
entire calendar year.
40
The number of lawsuits related to sensitive
information will likely continue to grow as companies increasingly
collect data and personal information to better understand
consumers, and as hackers become more sophisticated.
41
Currently,
35
Id.
36
See In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 (ADM/TNL), 2016 WL
81792, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016).
37
See Dominic Spinelli, Data Breach Standing: Recent Decisions Show
Growing Circuit Court Split, PEABODYARNOLD (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.peabodyarnold.com/data-breach-standing-recent-decisions-show-
growing-circuit-court-split/.
38
Id.
39
See Data Breaches Compromised 4.5 Billion Records in First Half of
2018, GEMALTO (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.gemalto.com/press/pages/data-
breaches-compromised-4-5-billion-records-in-first-half-of-2018.aspx.
40
2018 Saw 6,515 Reported Breaches, Exposing 5 Billon Sensitive Records,
HELP NET SECURITY (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/02/18/2018-reported-breaches/; 3
Months, 1900 Reported Breaches, 1.9 Billion Records Exposed,
HELP NET SECURITY (May 9, 2019),
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/05/09/2019-publicly-reported-breaches.
41
Bob Keaveney, As Hackers Get More Sophisticated, Businesses Should
Focus on Fundamentals, BIZTECH (Aug. 21, 2019),
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personal information is being utilized by retailers, social media
companies, financial institutions, healthcare organizations, and
scores of other businesses as a powerful tool to understand users and
consumers.
42
To run through a series of the myriad examples, social
media companies and search engines like Google and Facebook
often utilize personal information so that marketers can better target
consumers in the digital advertising space.
43
Data from personal
cellular devices can be sold to telecommunications groups.
44
That
personal data is then organized and used to determine customer traits
and behavioral traits.
45
Data brokers subsequently sell large amounts
of compiled data to companies, non-profits, and fundraisers.
46
Data
collection has also become an invaluable part of the medical field,
47
where health insurers have made access to files for patients,
prescription refills, and scheduling appointments more efficient,
decreasing health insurance costs as a result.
48
Personal data further
enables medical professionals to find correlations between
prescription drugs and their potential effects.
49
Various entities
collect personal information that people turn over, oftentimes in
exchange for free access to a website or application, without the
users necessarily understanding the purposes for which their
https://biztechmagazine.com/article/2019/08/hackers-get-more-sophisticated-
businesses-should-focus-fundamentals; see also Louise Matsakis, We’re All Just
Starting to Realize the Power of Personal Data, WIRED (Dec. 28, 2018, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/2018-power-of-personal-data/ (indicating
how individuals use search engines or social media while unaware of how major
corporations spend billions of dollars to acquire their personal data).
42
Maryanne Gaitho, How Applications of Big Data Drives Industries,
SIMPLI LEARN, https://www.simplilearn.com/big-data-applications-in-industries-
article (last updated Aug. 26, 2019).
43
Jeff Desjardins, How Much is Your Personal Data Worth?, VISUAL
CAPITALIST (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/much-personal-
data-worth/.
44
Id.
45
See MARC VAN LIESHOUT, THE VALUE OF PERSONAL DATA 5 (2015),
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01431593/document.
46
See id. at 3–4, 6.
47
Id. at 5.
48
Id. at 4–5.
49
Id. at 4.
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information is collected.
50
In exchange for access to a website’s
features or content, entities can require that cookies (site trackers
that follow users from website to website) be turned on.
51
The vast
collection of information has created a belief amongst Americans
that they cannot control how personal information is used by the
entities that collect their information.
52
In a 2017 PEW survey, only
nine percent of Americans were “very confident” social media
companies would protect their data, signifying the complete absence
of trust in social media companies.
53
In short, the market for personal information has become a
booming industry and one over which Americans feel they have
little control.
54
The Data Driven Marketing Institute
55
performed a
study to determine the value of individual level consumer data
(“ILCD”) in the United States.
56
In 2012, the market for ILCD was
worth approximately $156 billion and was responsible for 676,000
jobs.
57
But as personal information continues to increase in value,
create more jobs, and slip from the control of the individuals behind
that personal information, it also presents an increased value to
thieves and hackers. As more personal information is collected and
50
The Value of Personal Information Nowadays, EXPLORING YOUR MIND
(Sept. 16, 2018), https://exploringyourmind.com/value-personal-information-
nowadays/.
51
See Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who
is Using it), WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collection/.
52
See Lee Raine, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in
an Era of Privacy Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-
feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns/ (“Overall, a 2014
survey found that 91% of Americans ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that people
have lost control over how personal information is collected and used by all kinds
of entities.”).
53
Id.
54
LIESHOUT, supra note 45, at 3–5; see Raine, supra note 52.
55
Data-Driven Marketing Institute, DATA MARKETING & ANALYTICS,
https://thedma.org/advocacy/data-driven-marketing-institute/ (last visited Sept.
18, 2019) (The Data-DrivenMarketing Institute’s role is to inform individuals and
policymakers about how responsible data-driven marketing works, the countless
ways that it benefits consumers, and the economic benefits it holds.).
56
LIESHOUT, supra note 45, at 3.
57
Id.
INCREASING LAPSES IN DATA SECURITY 159
left vulnerable to third party hackers, the amount of viable litigation
brought against entities entrusted with personal information will
increase.
58
It follows, then, that entities possessing personally
identifiable information need to prepare to take adequate preventive
measures to protect themselves from litigation costs.
59
Data breach
cases have the potential to create large scale putative class actions,
which in turn may lead to costly settlements or large awards for
plaintiffs.
60
Entities should prepare for a resolution to a current
circuit split regarding when the harm suffered by data breach victims
is sufficient to establish standing. A more liberal interpretation of
harm that accounts for the increased risk of harm to data breach
victims expands the potential class of plaintiffs who have standing
to bring suit and will necessitate the just increase in information-
holding entities’ costs in defending or settling suits.
This Note examines conflicting holdings of various circuits on
issues of standing in data breach contexts and proposes a uniform
solution.
61
It posits that applying the “heightened risk of harm”
standard to standing would allow victims of stolen personal
information to seek recourse in a reasonable set of situations without
placing an unfair burden on the breached entities to defend against
an avalanche of lawsuits.
62
A “heightened risk of harm” standard
58
David Balser et al., INSIGHT: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:01 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insight-data-breach-
litigation-trends-to-watch (“As we move into the second quarter of [2019], we can
expect that not only will data breaches remain a common occurrence, but the scale
of litigation and regulatory investigations directed towards data security will
continue to expand.”).
59
See id.
60
ZETOONY ET AL., 2017DATABREACHLITIGATIONREPORT, supra note 22,
at 5.
61
See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 773 (8th Cir. 2017); Attias
v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores,
Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262
(4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–89
(6th Cir. 2016) (evidencing how different circuits have been unable to articulate
a uniform standard for establishing standing for victims’ data breaches).
62
See TRAVIS LEBLANC & JON. R. KNIGHT, A WAKE-UP CALL: DATA
BREACH STANDING IS GETTING EASIER 4 (2018),
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would consistently create uniformity in the courts by placing entities
that are responsible for the personally identifiable information of
others (as defined by each state’s data breach notification statute) on
notice that they need adequate security measures to guard against
breaches and that they must prepare for lawsuits should those
measures be lacking, even if personally identifying information has
yet to be used.
63
Part I of this Note will provide background on the standing
doctrine and the repercussions of conflicting circuit court rulings on
standing. Part II will examine holdings by the Fourth Circuit in Beck
v. McDonald and the Second Circuit in Whalen v. Michaels Stores
Inc., both cases in which victims of stolen information were found
to not have standing until and unless their personal information was
used to their detriment.
64
Part III will discuss holdings that found
plaintiffs who were the victims of a data breach to have standing.
This Part will review the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re
SuperValu, where it was found that a de minimis harm constitutes
standing in a data breach context.
65
This Part will also analyze the
decision by the Third Circuit in In re Horizon Healthcare Services
Inc. Data Breach Litigation, where it was held that a statutory
violation creates an injury in fact.
66
Additionally, this Part will
examine holdings by the D.C., Sixth, and Seventh Circuits which
determined that victims have standing to sue when they are at a
https://www.bsfllp.com/images/content/2/9/v2/2995/2018-01-17-Cyber-
Security-Wake-Up-Call-Data-Breach-Standing-Is.pdf.
63
See Lexi Rubow, Standing in the Way of Privacy Protections: The
Argument for a Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for Constitutional and
Statutory Causes of Action, 29 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1008, 1029 (2014). See
generally Hennessy et al., supra note 9 (providing a comprehensive list state data
breach notification laws).
64
See generally Whalen, 689 F. App’x 89 (discussing what harms are
sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact prong of standing analysis); Beck, 848 F.3d
262 (explaining how data breaches are “too speculative” to “constitute an injury-
in-fact”).
65
See generally In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (explaining the degree
of harm necessary to satisfy the injury in fact prong of standing analysis and
finding that the customer had standing).
66
See generally In reHorizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846
F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017) (articulating how a statutory violation can satisfy the
injury in fact prong of standing analysis).
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“heightened risk of harm.” Finally, Part IV will consider why the
Supreme Court should accept the “heightened risk of harm”
standard as the universal standard in order to encourage companies
to put stronger safeguards in place and provide victims of data
breaches an adequate opportunity to file suit. While a statutory
solution is a possibility, policy preferences amongst congressmen
that either favor a pro-business or pro-consumer agenda present an
obstacle to legislation.
67
Partisanship in Congress is particularly
apparent in the data breach context, where several bills that would
have imposed stricter requirements on businesses to notify
consumers following a data breach have been defeated.
68
A better
route to reform is through the Supreme Court accepting a
“heightened risk of harm standard” for establishing standing, as this
would resolve circuit splits in an expanding area of litigation in a
way that both avoids the partisanship problem in Congress and
accounts for the fact that the risk of identity theft is not speculative
because criminals increasingly hack databases to sell stolen personal
information or use it to commit other crimes.
69
I. DEVELOPMENT OF STANDINGDOCTRINE AND ITSAPPLICATION
TODATABREACHCASES
Article III standing, or the legal right to initiate a lawsuit, was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
70
There, the Court set forth three prongs to establish standing: (1) an
“injury in fact,” (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
67
Thomas Martecchini, A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs:
Preserving Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft After Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1494–95 (2016).
68
Id.
69
See Michael Hopkins, Your Personal Information Was Stolen? That’s an
Injury: Article III Standing in the Context of Data Breaches Not Sure” Should Not
Be Enough to Put Someone in Jail for Life, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 427, 451 (2019).
70
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557 (1992) (“Environmental
groups brought action challenging regulation of the Secretary of the Interior which
required other agencies to confer with him under the Endangered Species Act only
with respect to federally funded projects in the United States and on the high
seas.”).
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lawsuit, and (3) the ability of a court to redress the issue.
71
The
“injury in fact” prong was expressed by the Court to be an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical.”
72
The Court stated that the causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of has to be
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court.”
73
To satisfy the third prong, “it must be
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”
74
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA outlined the requirement
of “actual or imminent” harm to establish standing.
75
In Clapper,
plaintiffs challenged the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (“FISA”)
Court Amendments Act of 2008, which permitted the FISA court
(which oversees government requests for surveillance warrants
against certain foreign agents) to authorize surveillance with no
showing of probable cause that the target of the surveillance is an
agent of a foreign power; the government need only show that the
surveillance targets “persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States” and seeks to “acquire foreign intelligence
information.”
76
Respondents (“United States persons [who claimed
that they] engage[d] in sensitive international communications with
individuals who they believe[d we]re likely targets
of . . . surveillance”)
77
alleged that the resulting highly permissive
structure of electronic surveillance by the United States’ National
Security Agency on personal and private communications would
cause them to suffer future injuries in the form of increased financial
costs required to maintain confidentiality in overseas
71
Id. at 560–62.
72
Id. at 560.
73
Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41–42 (1976)).
74
Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
75
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
76
Id. at 404–05.
77
Id. at 401.
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communications.
78
The Court dismissed the case on grounds that the
challengers’ claims that they were likely to be targets of surveillance
were based “too much on a speculative chain of events that might
never occur, and because an injury for the standing purposes must
be ‘certainly impending,’ the plaintiffs could not satisfy the
constitutional requirement for being allowed to sue.”
79
The Court found that “conjectural” injuries
80
that were neither
“certainly impending” nor a “substantial risk” of creating future
harm did not merit standing.
81
Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
stated that “respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
future harm that is not certainly impending.”
82
Noting the potential
for government spying, however, four dissenting Justices stated that
“[i]ndeed it is as likely to take place as are most future events that
commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of human nature
tell us will happen.”
83
The decision in Clapper,
84
establishing that alleged harms must
be “certainly impending,” has been utilized as a defense by entities
being sued for failing to adequately protect consumer data.
85
The
“certainly impending” standard has proven an effective protection
for breached entities because it is often difficult for consumers to
connect the breach of information with a certainly impending
harm.
86
Justice Breyer explained in his dissent in Clapper why
78
See id. at 402, 406–07.
79
ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43107, FOREIGN
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FUTURE OF STANDING TO SUE POST-CLAPPER 7 (2013)
(citing Clapper, 568 U.S. 413–14).
80
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (describing
conjectural injuries as injuries that lack immediacy and concreteness).
81
See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414–15 n.5.
82
Id. at 416.
83
Id. at 422 (Breyer J., Ginsburg J., Sotomayor J., Kagan J., dissenting).
84
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 422.
85
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck
v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2017).
86
See SeanMcIntyre,Deeper Dive: Clapper Divide Expands in Data Breach
Cases, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (June 13, 2017),
https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/privacy-litigation/deeper-dive-clapper-
divide-expands-in-data-breach-cases/.
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plaintiffs struggle to make that connection when he critiqued the
Court’s use of a “certainly impending” standard:
[T]he word “certainly” in the phrase “certainly
impending” does not refer to absolute certainty. As
our case law demonstrates, what the Constitution
requires is something more akin to “reasonable
probability” or “high probability.” The use of some
such standard is all that is necessary here to ensure
the actual concrete injury that the Constitution
demands.
87
What Justice Breyer proposed is a standard more receptive of claims
like those of data breach victims, who are largely unable to meet the
“certainly impending” standard once their data is unauthorizedly
accessed.
A. The Effect of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins on Standing
Doctrine
In 2016, the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins reiterated
that in order to have Article III standing, the injury suffered must be
“concrete and particularized.”
88
In Spokeo, the plaintiff alleged that
an internet search engine listed inaccurate information about his
credit history in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
89
The
Court held that the plaintiff’s alleged reputational, intangible harm
was not “concrete and particularized.”
90
This would appear to weigh
in favor of entities facing lawsuits related to data breaches in arguing
that plaintiffs do not have Article III standing.
91
However, the Court
failed to define what constitutes a “concrete” injury.
92
The portion
of the Spokeo decision which established that an injury is “concrete”
if there is a “risk of real harm”—as opposed to a purely statutory or
87
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 440–41 (Breyer J., Ginsburg J., Sotomayor J., Kagan
J., dissenting).
88
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
89
Id. at 1544.
90
Id.
91
See LEBLANC&KNIGHT, supra note 62, at 1.
92
See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (failing to
define a “concrete” injury in the context of standing doctrine).
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abstract harm
93
—thus weighs in favor plaintiffs in data breach
lawsuits attempting to establish standing to sue.
After Spokeo, the Third,
94
Sixth,
95
Seventh,
96
Eighth,
97
and the
D.C Circuits
98
have been split with the Fourth
99
and Second
100
Circuits on what constitutes Article III standing in data breach
lawsuits. The 2017 decisions in Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., Galaria v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., and In re SuperValu illustrated
that courts have become more inclined to find that Article III
standing exists in class action data breach lawsuits.
101
However,
inconsistency remains: the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits
found standing even when the plaintiffs had suffered no monetary
harm, whereas the Fourth and Second Circuits held that the plaintiffs
did not have standing in similar circumstances.
102
Spokeo’s divergent progeny in the circuit courts with regard to
stolen personal information
103
follows. In Attias, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs did not have
standing when plaintiffs alleged that their health insurer failed to
protect their personal information from a hack.
104
While there was
no known misuse of the information, the D.C. Circuit found it
93
Id. at 1549.
94
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625 (3d
Cir. 2017).
95
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016).
96
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
97
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
98
Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
99
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274–75 (4th Cir. 2017).
100
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017).
101
See GIBSON, DUNN& CRUTCHER LLP, U.S. CYBERSECURITY AND DATA
PRIVACY OUTLOOK AND REVIEW – 2018 21–22 (2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/us-cybersecurity-
and-data-privacy-outlook-and-review-2018.pdf.
102
Id. at 22.
103
See generallyTRAVISLEBLANC&KNIGHT, supra note 62 (analyzing how
certain circuit courts have approved “several standing theories,” whereas other
circuits have not found standing in cases).
104
Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622–23 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(Policyholders of CareFirst brought a class action suit against the insurer after
personal information such as names, birthdates, email addresses, and subscriber
identification numbers were stolen in a hack.).
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plausible that the thieves who perpetuated the hack would misuse
the personally identifiable information they had stolen.
105
The
Seventh,
106
D.C.,
107
and Sixth
108
Circuits have all found that, when
personal information is stolen, plaintiffs have standing based on the
risk of a future harm because, as stated by the D.C. Circuit, “at the
very least, it is plausible to infer that [the thief] has both the intent
and the ability to use that data for ill.”
109
Conversely, the Fourth
Circuit did not find constitutional standing in Beck v. McDonald
when a laptop with private information similar to the information in
Attiaswas stolen, but the information was not misused.
110
There, the
Fourth Circuit found that the risk to the plaintiffs was too
speculative to find standing because it was not certain that the stolen
information would be used for fraudulent purposes.
111
Similarly, in
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the Second Circuit did not find
standing when the details of the plaintiff’s credit card were stolen
by hackers who breached the defendant company’s network.
112
The
court found that there was no risk of future harm because the
plaintiff had cancelled her credit card, eliminating the risk of harm
in the court’s perspective.
113
The inconsistency among the circuits with respect to the theft of
similar types of personal information
114
is particularly troublesome
as data breaches become more common and as the market for stolen
information continues to grow, making it harder for individuals to
be aware that their information has been stolen until after misuse has
105
Id. at 628.
106
Remijas v. NeimanMarcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015).
107
See Attias., 865 F.3d at 620.
108
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388–89 (6th Cir.
2016).
109
Attias, 865 F.3d at 628.
110
Compare id., with Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 277 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“[N]ames, birth dates, the last four digits of social security numbers, and physical
descriptors ([such as] age, race, gender, height, and weight)” were on the stolen
laptops.).
111
Beck, 848 F.3d at 274–76.
112
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017).
113
Id. at 90.
114
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 773 (8th Cir. 2017); Attias, 865
F.3d at 629; Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91; Beck, 848 F.3d at 267; Galaria v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–89 (6th Cir. 2016).
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occurred. A “heightened risk of harm standard” would protect
victims from a predominantly clandestine harm while not expanding
standing doctrine problematically. Concerns for an expansive
standing doctrine largely arise in lawsuits targeted at government
action, coupled by complaints that expansion could busy the court
system with matters that have legislative solutions rooted in the
political process; this concern does not apply to legal action against
private companies where the political process is not a realistic
solution.
115
B. The Effect of a Circuit Split on Standing in Data Breach
Contexts
The lack of uniformity on the standing issue in data breach cases
has substantial implications as more and more entities collect,
aggregate, and use individuals’ personal information. The vast
collection of personal information creates a larger risk that the
information will be misused, as a Pew survey found that 64% of
Americans “have personally experienced a major data breach.”
116
In
2019, a single data breach at Capital One caused over 100 million
individuals to have their personal information—including bank
accounts, social security numbers, names, addresses, and dates of
birth—stolen.
117
The number of publicly reported data breaches
leading to class action litigation continues to increase; “5.7% of data
breaches publicly reported in 2018 led to class action litigation in
2018.”
118
This is indicative of a potential increase in litigation
115
Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV.
439, 460 (2017).
116
Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26,
2017), https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.
117
Kelly Tyko,Massive Data Breach Hits Capital One, AffectingMore Than
100 Million Customers, USA TODAY (July 29, 2019, 7:42 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/07/29/capital-one-data-breach-
2019-millions-affected-new-breach/1863259001/.
118
ZETOONY ET AL., 2019 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT, supra note
21, at 2 (“This is a 1.7% increase from 2017 and a 2.4% increase from 2016,
indicating a steady increase in class action litigation relative to the number of
breaches.”).
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nationwide if hackers continue to target personal information,
chasing its increased value.
119
As data breaches and data breach litigation alike become
commonplace, a circuit split will continue to have disparate and
detrimental effects on both entities that collect personal information
and victims of data breaches. Inconsistency with regard to what
types of harms establish standing will make it difficult for entities to
evaluate the likelihood of data breach litigation and related costs.
120
Additionally, the victims of data breaches will continue to face
uncertainty as to whether they have standing or if the courts will
dismiss their efforts to be made whole for the pending threat of
misused information and identity theft.
121
The current circuit split
creates a legal environment wherein despite most entities collecting
similar forms of personal information,
122
only victims of data
breaches who decide to sue in favorable circuits are entitled to a
remedy—a result that is neither fair nor just.
Different rulings on standing in data breach litigation have real
impacts on the victims of data breaches. Once cases survive a
motion to dismiss on standing grounds, they typically settle because
data breaches attract regulatory attention and bad press for the
breached entity: “negative reputational and branding impacts” of
data breaches on the entities that could not protect personal
information largely motivate decisions to settle.
123
119
Id. at 1 (noting “a 26% increase” in the number of class actions filed from
2016 to 2018 and a “100% increase” compared to the 2017 report).
120
SeeMegan L. Brown et al., D.C. Circuit Data Breach Standing Decision
Will Encourage More Litigation Over Security in New Technology, WILEY REIN
LLP (Aug. 2017),
https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-PIF_August_2017-
DC_Circuit_Data_Breach_Standing_Decision_Will_Encourage_More_Litigatio
n_Over_Security_in_New_Technology.html.
121
See Do Data Breach Victims Have Standing to Sue?, CONCORD L. SCH.
(June 28, 2019), https://www.concordlawschool.edu/blog/news/do-data-breach-
victims-have-standing-to-sue/.
122
See Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (and What
They’re Doing with It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018, 2:25 PM),
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html.
123
Alexander H. Southwell et al., Gibson Dunn Reviews U.S. Cybersecurity
and Data Privacy, COLUMBIA L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 3, 2017),
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Defendants choosing to settle represent a widespread trend, as
evidenced by settlements with consumer-plaintiffs, financial
institution-plaintiffs, and attorney general-plaintiffs alike.
124
Large
settlement agreements over data breaches included Anthem’s $115
million settlement after hackers gained access to almost 80 million
customer records;
125
Target’s $18.5 million settlement after hackers
obtained credit card, debit card, and personal information of fifty
million customers;
126
and Home Depot’s $25 million settlement
after hackers stole customer payment information from self-
checkout machines.
127
These multi-million-dollar settlement
agreements indicate the need for entities possessing personal
information to take measures to avoid and respond to lawsuits
through both increased security measures and legal preparation for
seemingly inevitable data breach lawsuits.
128
The ability to prepare
for breaches and lawsuits, however, is conditioned upon an
understanding of what plaintiffs can and cannot sue for—a concept
currently non-uniform.
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/02/03/gibson-dunn-reviews-u-s-
cybersecurity-and-data-privacy/.
124
David Balser et al., Insight: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-
data-security/insight-data-breach-litigation-trends-to-watch.
125
Aaron P. Bernstein,Anthem to Pay Record $115M to Settle Lawsuits Over
Data Breach, NBC NEWS (Jun. 23, 2017, 6:41 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/anthem-pay-record-115m-settle-
lawsuits-over-data-breach-n776246.
126
Sruthi Ramakriishnan & Nandita Bose et al., Target in $18.5 Million
Multi-State Settlement Over Data Breach, REUTERS (May 23, 2017, 12:30 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-target-cyber-settlement/target-in-18-5-
million-multi-state-settlement-over-data-breach-idUSKBN18J2GH.
127
Jeff John Roberts,Home Depot to Pay Banks $25 Million in Data Breach
Settlement, FORTUNE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/home-depot-
data-breach-banks/.
128
See Raymond Pompon, Breach Costs Are Rising with the Prevalence of
Lawsuits, F5 LABS (May 2, 2018),
https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/cisotociso/breach-costs-are-rising-with-the-
prevalence-of-lawsuits (listing the most recent settlement agreements in class
action lawsuits with consumer-plaintiffs, financial institution-plaintiffs, and
attorney general-plaintiffs).
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II. FINDING THAT STANDINGDOESNOT EXIST IN ADATABREACH
CONTEXT
Some circuits have maintained that Article III standing does not
exist when a plaintiff only shows an increased risk of harm as a
result of the subject data breach.
129
The lack of clarity in the
Supreme Court decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins has contributed to
the Fourth and Second Circuits concluding that future harms cannot
establish standing while other circuits have concluded the opposite,
finding that future harm is enough to establish standing.
130
A. The Fourth Circuit—A High Standard for Standing
Unmet
The Fourth Circuit did not find constitutional standing in Beck
v. McDonald when a laptop connected to a pulmonary functioning
device and four boxes of pathology reports were misplaced or stolen
from William Jennings Bryan Dorn Veterans Affairs Medical
Center (“the VAMC”) in Columbus, South Carolina.
131
The stolen
or misplaced laptop contained unencrypted personal information of
approximately 7,400 patients, and the boxes held information on
over 2,000 patients.
132
The information included names, birth dates,
the last four digits of social security numbers, descriptive traits of
patients, and medical diagnoses.
133
Breaches similar to this are
problematic because hackers typically use this type of information
to open lines of credit or take out loans in patients’ names.
134
The
VAMC’s internal investigation concluded that the laptop was likely
stolen and that the stolen information was attributable to the
VAMC’s failure to follow proper procedures for maintaining
129
LEBLANC &KNIGHT, supra note 62.
130
See id. at 1, 3.
131
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2017).
132
Id. at 267–68.
133
Id. at 268. .
134
What Hackers Actually Do with Your Stolen Medical Records, ADVISORY
BOARD (Mar. 1, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-
briefing/2019/03/01/hackers.
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personal information on encrypted computers.
135
The VAMC
subsequently contacted patients whose personal information was
stolen and notified them of the breach,
136
in accordance with South
Carolina data breach notification requirements.
137
After litigation
ensued, the VAMC suffered “at least seventeen [additional] data
breaches” due to failure to implement proper procedures to secure
information.
138
Richard Beck and Lakreishia Jeffrey, veterans who received
treatment at the VAMC,
139
filed a putative class action suit on behalf
of the victims of the stolen personal information from the initial
breach on the VAMC laptop.
140
The plaintiffs sought declaratory
and monetary relief under the Privacy Act of 1974
141
for the threat
of “current and future substantial harm from identity theft and other
misuse of their [p]ersonal [i]nformation.”
142
Additionally, Beverly
Watson filed a putative class action suit on behalf of the victims of
the stolen personal information contained in the pathology
reports;
143
the plaintiffs in that lawsuit also sought declaratory and
monetary damages for the threat of future and current harm from
identity theft and other misuse of their personal information.
144
These claims were consolidated, and the Fourth Circuit addressed
the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
145
After reiterating the standards from Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, the court examined the claims for (1)
135
Beck, 848 F.3d at 276; Haley Amster, Beck v. McDonald: Standing
Requirements in Consumer Data Breach Suits, JURIS (May 2, 2017),
http://dukeundergraduatelawmagazine.org/2017/05/02/beck-v-mcdonald-
standing-requirements-in-consumer-data-breach-suits/.
136
Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
137
S.C. CODEANN. § 39-1-90 (2019).
138
Beck, 848 F.3d at 268.
139
Id. at 267.
140
Id.
141
See generallyRecordsMaintained on Individuals, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018)
(explaining that the Privacy Act governs the maintenance and disclosure of
records by federal agencies).
142
Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
143
Id. at 268.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 266, 270.
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an injury in fact; (2) a traceable connection between the alleged
injury in fact and the conduct of the defendant; and (3) whether the
court could provide a remedy to the injury alleged by the
plaintiffs.
146
The court began its analysis with a determination of whether an
injury in fact existed in Beck,
147
clarifying that, while a threat of an
injury may qualify as an injury in fact, that standard only applies
under certain circumstances.
148
FollowingClapper, the injury in fact
must not be premised on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities”
but an injury that is “certainly impending.”
149
In Beck, the court
applied these principles to the plaintiffs’ allegations of “(1) the
increased risk of future identity theft, and (2) the cost of protecting
against [identity theft].”
150
The plaintiffs relied on previous opinions
from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits to demonstrate instances
where future risk of identity theft proved sufficient to a finding of
the existence of an injury in fact such that Article III standing was
found to be intact.
151
The Fourth Circuit rejected the other circuits’ opinions,
distinguishing Beck from cases that found standing in the context of
data breach lawsuits.
152
It contended that the injury in fact in circuits
that found standing created a sufficiently imminent injury, whereas
in Beck, the alleged injury was overly speculative.
153
The injuries
suffered in Beck were considered too speculative because (1) there
was no proof that the thief stole the laptop with the purpose of
obtaining the personal information on the laptop; (2) there was no
proof that the thief stole the pathology reports with the purpose of
obtaining the personal information enclosed within them; and (3) a
146
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
147
Beck, 848 F.3d 262 at 269–71.
148
“[T]he Supreme Court has ‘emphasized repeatedly,’ an injury-in-fact
‘must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense.’” Beck, 848 F.3d at
271 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); Friends of Earth
Inc., v. Gatson Cooper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000).
149
Beck, 848 F.3d at 272 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410).
150
Id. at 273.
151
See id. at 273–74.
152
See id. at 274 (purporting to distinguish the facts at hand from other cases
that found standing in data breach settings).
153
Id.
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substantial amount of time had passed without plaintiffs suffering a
harm.
154
The court in Beck determined that, in cases which found
standing, the individual(s) who stole personal information acted
with the sole purpose of obtaining stolen personal information.
155
The Fourth Circuit distinguished the facts in Beckwhen it concluded
that there was a deliberate targeting of personal information in those
other cases, and in so finding it relied upon factors including the
sophistication of the hacking that took place, the lack of an
alternative explanation for the hacking, and the fraudulent activity
(such as identity theft and fraudulent charges) suffered by the
plaintiffs.
156
In Beck, the absence of proof that the stolen laptop and
pathology reports were opened or that the thief stole those items with
the intention of obtaining personal information prevented the court
from concluding that an injury in fact existed.
157
The VAMC’s
internal investigation determining the items were stolen as a result
of theft was insufficient to confer standing because it did not
demonstrate that the purpose of the theft was to obtain personal
information.
158
Additionally, the alleged injuries were seen as
speculative because no actual harm or fraudulent activity occurred
in the two years following the theft.
159
The analysis of whether there was a possible “injury in fact” in
Beck continued with a determination of whether or not a “substantial
risk” of harm existed.
160
The Fourth Circuit rejected statistics
showing that data breaches result in identity theft as well as the
VAMC’s offer of free credit monitoring to plaintiffs as evidence of
a “substantial risk.”
161
Additionally, the court refused to conclude
154
Id. at 274–75.
155
See id. at 273.
156
Id. at 273 (citing Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384,
387–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688,
692, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2015); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–
43 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632–34 (7th Cir.
2007)).
157
Beck, 848 F.3d at 275.
158
Id. at 267, 275.
159
Id. at 274.
160
Id. at 276.
161
Id. at 268.
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that the purchase of credit monitoring software and the burden of
monitoring personal accounts for fraud constituted an injury in
fact.
162
Although the risk of future harm through identity theft could
constitute a “substantial” harm, the court concluded the threat was
self-imposed and “speculative” because it was not certainly
impending and therefore did not merit finding standing.
163
B. The Second Circuit—One Fraudulent Credit Card
Charge is Insufficient to Find Standing
Courts have been unwilling to clarify how extensive the harm
suffered by a plaintiff must be to satisfy the injury in fact prong of
standing analysis. In Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the Second
Circuit examined a case where the plaintiff’s credit card information
was stolen during the course of a data breach at Michaels Stores.
164
After the breach, Michaels Stores issued a press release stating that
customers’ credit and debit card information was stolen in a breach
and that Michaels would be offering twelve months of identity
protection and credit card monitoring services to customers for
free.
165
The plaintiff alleged that “(1) her credit card information
was stolen and used twice in attempted fraudulent purchases; (2) she
face[d] a risk of future identity fraud; and (3) she [] lost time and
money resolving the attempted fraudulent charges and monitoring
her credit.”
166
As in Beck,
167
the court in Whalen did not find that an injury in
fact occurred; therefore, Article III standing did not exist.
168
The
plaintiff was neither “asked to pay, nor did [she] pay [for,] any [of
the] fraudulent charge[s]” because the credit card was cancelled
before the plaintiff became liable for any charges.
169
That fact that
the charges were fraudulently made was not “particularized and
162
Id.
163
Id. at 276–77 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416
(2013)).
164
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Beck, 848 F.3d at 276.
168
Whalen, 689 F. App’x. at 91.
169
Id. at 90.
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concrete” enough for the court to find standing because she did not
suffer any monetary losses, nor did she face any future threat of
monetary loss.
170
Additionally, because no other personally
identifiable information was stolen from Michaels Stores, there was
no future risk of identity theft.
171
The court found that the plaintiff’s
claim that she spent additional time and money monitoring her
account in response to potential fraudulent activity was
insufficiently supported with regard to the efforts undertaken to
show an injury in fact.
172
III. FINDING STANDING IN ADATABREACHCONTEXT
While some circuits have maintained that Article III standing
does not exist as a result of an increased risk of harm in a data breach
context,
173
others have found standing based on various theories.
174
The Eighth Circuit found standing based on de minimis harm, and
the Third Circuit found an injury based on a statutory violation.
175
Additionally, the D.C., Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have found
standing based on the substantial risk of harm created during a data
breach.
176
These circuits demonstrate drastic divergence amongst
the courts with regard to their interpretation of the standing doctrine
in the data breach context, even when the ultimate result is a finding
of standing.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 91.
173
See id.; Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276 (4th Cir. 2017).
174
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 772 (8th Cir. 2017); Attias v.
CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
175
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 773; In re Horizon Healthcare Servs.
Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 631 (3d Cir. 2017); LEBLANC&KNIGHT,
supra note 62, at 2.
176
See Attias, 865 F.3d at 628; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388; Remijas, 794
F.3d at 690.
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A. Article III Standing Based on De Minimis Harm
In In re SuperValu, Inc., the Eighth Circuit found standing in a
manner that, at least facially, appeared to conflict with the decisions
in the Fourth and Second Circuits.
177
Similar to the facts in Whalen
v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,
178
the hackers in SuperValu installed
malware in the network of SuperValu grocery stores in order to
access records of consumer credit card transactions.
179
As in
Whalen, the information stolen by hackers was limited to credit card
numbers, expiration dates, and card value verification codes.
180
The
plaintiffs alleged that hackers accessed their information because of
SuperValu’s poor security measures.
181
These alleged inadequacies
included easy-to-guess and unencrypted passwords meant to protect
sensitive information, failure to segregate credit card information
from other parts of the company’s network, and the absence of
protective firewalls.
182
The plaintiffs in SuperValu alleged that, as a
result of the security breach, they faced an imminent threat of
identity theft, sacrificed time monitoring accounts to ensure there
was no fraudulent activity, and awaited the constant possibility that
their credit card information would be used for prolonged periods of
time to perpetuate fraudulent activity.
183
They attempted to support
their claims with a Government Accountability Office report on the
likelihood of identity theft as a result of a data breach.
184
The plaintiffs in SuperValu alleged that inadequate security
measures allowed for a breach that caused the same injury in fact as
177
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 773 (finding that plaintiff had Article
III standing based on one instance of unreimbursed fraudulent credit card
activity). But cf. Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 91; Beck, 848 F.3d at 277–78.
178
Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90.
179
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 766.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 770.
182
Id. at 766.
183
Id. at 766–67.
184
The Government Accountability Office “examines the use of public
funds; evaluates federal programs and activities; and provides analyses, options,
recommendations, and other assistance to help the Congress make effective
oversight, policy, and funding decisions.” GAO’s Mission, Responsibilities,
Strategies, and Means, GAO U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/dsp/3mission.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
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inWhalen—fraudulent credit card charges as a result of stolen credit
card information.
185
In Whalen, the plaintiff brought a class action
suit based on claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach of
implied contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of various state
consumer protection and data breach notification laws.
186
In
SuperValu, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the claims brought by all of
the plaintiffs except for one, the plaintiff who had incurred a
fraudulent charge.
187
The complaint in Whalen “assert[ed] claims
for breach of an implied contract and for a violation of New York
General Business Law [Section] 349.”
188
In both cases, plaintiffs
attempted to bolster the existence of an injury in fact by providing
statistics on the likelihood that their personal information would be
used for criminal activity as a result of data breaches.
189
Additionally, the defendants in both cases issued similar press
releases informing the public that a theft of consumer information
occurred.
190
In SuperValu, the Eighth Circuit began its analysis by
conducting an injury in fact analysis on the plaintiffs whose credit
card information had not actually been misused to ascertain if they
had standing to sue and could therefore survive defendants’ motion
to dismiss.
191
In applying the standards established in Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, the court concluded that for these
plaintiffs, the alleged injury was too speculative to find that Article
III standing existed.
192
In coming to this conclusion, the court
rejected the assertion that, based upon information and belief,
plaintiffs’ information was being sold on websites and their
respective financial institutions were undertaking a heavy burden to
protect their information.
193
Similar to Beck v. McDonald, the court
in SuperValu rejected the contention that statistics indicating an
increased likelihood of theft after a data breach were sufficient to
185
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 766.
186
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
187
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 775.
188
Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 89.
189
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 767;Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90.
190
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 766;Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90.
191
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 768.
192
Id. at 769–72.
193
Id. at 770.
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prove that a “substantial risk of future identity theft” existed; it held
that the complaint did not sufficiently allege a substantial risk of
identity theft and that the customers’ allegations of future injury did
not support standing.
194
In light of this, the court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for all plaintiffs who did not incur a
fraudulent charge, but it found that standing existed for the sole
plaintiff whose credit card incurred a fraudulent charge because the
complaint contained sufficient allegations to demonstrate that the
customer “suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the
defendants’ security practices, and likely to be redressed by a
favorable judgment.”
195
The court in SuperValu concluded that a fraudulent charge is a
form of identity theft that constitutes a “concrete[] and
particularized injury” which satisfies the injury in fact requirement
for Article III standing.
196
This is in stark contrast with the decision
of the Second Circuit in Whalen, where the court found that a
fraudulent credit card charge did not constitute a “particularized and
concrete” injury because the company cancelled the credit card
without the plaintiff being held liable for the charges.
197
Despite an
abundance of factual similarities, SuperValu and Whalen came to
opposite conclusions.
198
Both cases involved hackers gaining access
to a network of consumers’ credit card information, and both
breaches resulted in a fraudulent charge against a plaintiff.
199
Furthermore, the data breaches in both cases did not involve
personal information beyond the scope of stolen credit card
information.
200
But similar factual situations have proven
insufficient for consistency in this respect.
The differing conclusions are at least partially attributable to the
Eighth Circuit finding the burden of establishing standing to be a
194
Id. at 771–72.
195
Id. at 773.
196
Id. at 770.
197
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x. 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017).
198
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 774; Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–
91.
199
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 767;Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90.
200
See id.
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“threshold inquiry.”
201
The “threshold inquiry” standard enabled the
Eighth Circuit to find that incurring fraudulent charges satisfied the
“general allegations” necessary to establish an injury in fact—
regardless of whether the charges were reimbursed or not.
202
This
analysis directly contradicts the value the Second Circuit placed on
whether the fraudulent charges were reimbursed in Whalen: the
Eighth Circuit concluded reimbursement did not quash the injury in
fact prong, but the Second Circuit found that reimbursed fraudulent
charges did not constitute an injury in fact.
203
The court did not need
to reach the possibility of a future harm satisfying the injury in fact
prong in an Article III standing analysis because it found that
incurring fraudulent charges, regardless of reimbursement,
constituted an injury in fact.
204
The seemingly arbitrary distinction
in the injury in fact analysis between the Second and Eighth Circuits
adds to the unpredictability in data breach standing doctrine
regarding whether victims of data breaches have standing when
charges are reimbursed.
205
The Eighth Circuit in SuperValu continued its standing analysis
by applying the remaining two factors necessitated by Clapper: (1)
that a causal connection between the injury suffered and the alleged
wrongful conduct exists, and (2) that a court can redress the
injury.
206
The analysis turned to the causation between the alleged
injury in fact, the fraudulent charges, and the breach of SuperValu’s
network.
207
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the
plaintiff must allege his particular fraudulent charge was a result of
the defendants’ data breach.
208
Instead, the court required that he
allege his fraudulent charge was fairly traceable to the defendants’
201
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 773. “[S]tanding under Article III
presents only a ‘threshold inquiry,’ requiring ‘general allegations’ of injury,
causation, and redressability.” Id. (citations omitted).
202
Id.
203
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 774; Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90
(concluding that because the plaintiff was neither asked to pay nor did she pay for
any of the fraudulent charges, no injury in fact occurred).
204
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 773.
205
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 767;Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90.
206
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
207
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 772.
208
Id.
180 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
breaches.
209
Plaintiff’s statement of a causal connection between the
deficiencies and failures in the defendants’ cybersecurity, the
hacking of the defendants’ network, the theft of customers’ credit
card information from defendants’ network, and the plaintiff’s
incurring a fraudulent credit card charge satisfied the causation
requirement of the court’s standing analysis.
210
Lastly, the court
concluded it had the power of redressability as it applied to the
unreimbursed fraudulent charges.
211
The Eighth Circuit finding that
plaintiffs have standing from one potentially reimbursed charge
212
creates an unequal application of standing doctrine and uncertainty
for both victims of data breaches and entities responsible for
personal information.
B. Article III Standing Based on a Statutory Violation
In Third Circuit case In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc.
Data Breach Litigation, two unencrypted laptops containing
detailed personal information on approximately 839,000 clients
were stolen from Horizon’s headquarters.
213
The stolen laptops
contained personally identifiable information and protected health
information of clients and potential clients.
214
When the Horizon
Healthcare clients filed suit, the Third Circuit found standing based
on a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).
215
The
plaintiffs alleged that Horizon willfully and negligently violated the
FCRA,
216
which attempts to protect consumer privacy and
specifically imposes requirements on a “consumer reporting
agency” that “regularly . . . assembl[es] or evaluat[es] consumer
credit information . . . for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties.”
217
The plaintiffs argued that Horizon
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 773.
212
See id. at 774.
213
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625,
630 (3d Cir. 2017).
214
Id.
215
Id. at 635.
216
Id. at 629.
217
Definitions; rules of construction, 15 U.S.C § 1681a(f) (2018).
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violated its statutory obligation when it failed to secure their
information from unauthorized use, thereby constituting an injury in
fact.
218
The Third Circuit found that Congress may “cast the standing
net broadly” and that a violation of a statutory right, even “absent
evidence of actual monetary loss,” can be sufficient to constitute an
“actual or threatened injury.”
219
The court explained that the
violation of a statutory right creates a de facto injury that does not
require focus on monetary losses.
220
The Third Circuit clarified that
its ruling did not contradict the Supreme Court in Spokeo but
followed stare decisis by concluding that the plaintiffs did suffer a
“concrete” injury in Horizon Healthcare.
221
It reasoned that the
plaintiffs alleged more than a “mere technical or procedural
violation,” but an “unauthorized dissemination of their own private
information—the very injury that FCRA is intended to prevent.”
222
The Horizon Healthcare decision provided another avenue—a
violation of a statutory right—for plaintiffs in class action data
breach lawsuits to obtain standing.
223
This route may increase the
number of plaintiffs able to obtain standing, as new plaintiffs may
seek to state claims based on the Horizon Healthcare precedent that
a failure to protect personal information constitutes an injury in fact
regardless of whether the plaintiffs suffered actual harm,
224
as
plaintiffs who ground their standing on a statutory right do not need
to prove that the stolen information caused them to suffer identity
theft of any kind.
225
218
See Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 631–32.
219
Id. at 635–36 (citations omitted).
220
See id. at 636.
221
Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 640; see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136
S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).
222
Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 640.
223
Id. at 640.
224
Gregory N. Blasé et al., Third Circuit Moves Toward a Broader View of
Standing in FCRA Data Breach Class Action, KL GATES (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://www.klgates.com/third-circuit-moves-toward-a-broader-view-of-standing-
in-fcra-data-breach-class-action-01-30-2017/.
225
Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 640–41.
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C. Standing Based on a Future Risk of Harm
Courts have varied with regard to what constitutes a future risk
of harm,
226
further muddying the waters of standing doctrine. In
Clapper, the Supreme Court held that the risk of future harm may
satisfy the injury in fact requirement for Article III standing so long
as the alleged harm is “certainly impending.”
227
While the Fourth
and Second Circuits found a plaintiff’s risk of future harm in a data
breach context too speculative to constitute an “injury in fact,”
228
the
D.C., Sixth, and Seventh Circuits found that a future risk of harm
does constitute an “injury in fact.”
229
Satisfying the “injury in fact”
prong is a considerable hurdle to achieving standing and marks a
clear circuit split.
230
The more expansive approach to standing that
considers a plaintiff’s risk of future harm sufficient to constitute an
“injury in fact” better values the intrusive nature of personal data
disclosures and the ability to provide a remedy to an increasingly
problematic topic.
231
i. The D.C. Circuit
In Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., healthcare provider CareFirst “failed
to properly encrypt” its servers.
232
A breach occurred in 2014,
resulting in the theft of an estimated one million insureds’ personal
information.
233
Seven insureds subsequently filed a class action
226
Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388, (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015).
227
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
228
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017);
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017).
229
Attias, 865 F.3d at 623; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 387–89; Remijas, 794
F.3d at 690.
230
Attias, 865 F.3d at 627; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388; Remijas, 794 F.3d
at 693–94.
231
See Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion and the Modern Data
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 828 (2018).
232
Attias, 865 F.3d at 623.
233
Id. at 622.
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lawsuit against CareFirst.
234
The parties disagreed on whether the
hackers were able to obtain the insureds’ social security numbers,
and CareFirst sought to dismiss the claims for lack of standing.
235
Focusing on the “injury in fact” analysis, the court relied on Clapper
to conclude that an “injury in fact” exists when there is a
‘“substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”
236
Unlike in Clapper,
however, the court concluded that there were not so many links in
the causal chain as to make the alleged injuries too speculative; thus,
the plaintiffs had standing.
237
This directly contradicts the decision
in Beck, where the Fourth Circuit, applying Clapper, found that the
theft of unencrypted laptops and pathology reports containing
similar personal information was too speculative to confer standing
without proof that the thief acted for the purpose of obtaining
personal information.
238
Conversely, the court in Attias stated that,
in assuming all the allegations in the complaint were true (meaning
social security numbers and credit card information were stolen), it
was not too speculative to consider the plausible harms that
plaintiffs could endure because, “at the very least, it is plausible []to
infer that [the thief] has both the intent and the ability to use that
data for ill.”
239
Moreover, the court reasoned that the nature of the
hack and the information stolen merited a finding that a “substantial
risk” existed.
240
Additionally, the court in Beck emphasized that,
because the plaintiffs’ stolen information was not used for
fraudulent activity from the time of the theft in 2014 to the time of
the suit in 2017, there was no risk of “substantial harm.”
241
While
the hack in Attias also occurred in 2014, the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that the stolen information still created a plausible “substantial risk”
of harm, irrespective of the time that had passed without incident
such that the passage of time did not mitigate or negate the
substantial risk.
242
234
Id. at 623.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 626.
237
Id. at 629.
238
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274–75 (4th Cir. 2017).
239
Attias, 865 F.3d at 628.
240
Id. at 628.
241
See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275.
242
See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629.
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ii. The Sixth Circuit
In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., financial and
insurance company Nationwide suffered a personal network hack.
243
The breached network held the names, dates of birth, employment
histories, and social security numbers of over 1.1 million
customers.
244
Following the breach, the victims filed a class action
suit against Nationwide alleging FCRA violations and additional
claims based on negligence, invasion of privacy by public disclosure
of private facts, and bailment.
245
Just as in Beck and Whalen, the
plaintiffs inGalaria alleged that the theft left themwith an increased
risk of identity theft and that as a result they would incur “financial
and temporal” losses.
246
The court did not find standing based on the
alleged FCRA violation as in Horizon Healthcare
247
but instead
focused on the “substantial risk” of harm to the victims of the data
breach.
248
Similar to Attias, the court in Galaria found that the theft of the
personal information created a substantial risk in and of itself.
249
This decision to find a “substantial risk” of harm solely based on the
theft of personal information differs from the courts in Beck and
Whalen, which found that theft of information alone was too
speculative to confer standing.
250
While the court in Beck refused to
find that the defendant offering to pay for credit monitoring services
was evidence of a “substantial risk,” the court in Galaria came to
the opposite conclusion when it stated, “Nationwide seems to
recognize the severity of the risk, given its offer to provide credit-
243
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir.
2016).
244
Id. at 387–89.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 386, 388.
247
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625,
640 (3d Cir. 2017).
248
Id. at 387–88.
249
Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017);Galaria, 663
F. App’x at 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
250
See Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 387–89. But seeWhalen v. Michaels Stores,
Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274
(4th Cir. 2017).
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monitoring and identity-theft protection for a full year.”
251
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit in Galaria stated that any time and
money the plaintiffs spent monitoring their credit, checking their
bank statements, or modifying their financial accounts constituted
“an actual injury.”
252
While the court in Whalen found that the lack
of specificity in the allegations that the data breach caused the
plaintiff to expend time and money monitoring credit or checking
bank statements, the decision in Galaria makes it possible for
specifically-pleaded allegations to merit the court’s finding of an
“actual injury.”
253
The Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
followed and supported the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that courts
need not wait for actual misuse to occur to establish standing.
254
iii. The Seventh Circuit
In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, hackers obtained the
credit card information of consumers through malware installed on
Neiman Marcus department store servers.
255
The hackers obtained
nearly 350,000 credit card numbers, and 9,200 of those cards
affirmatively reported fraudulent activity.
256
The plaintiffs filed a
class action lawsuit alleging negligence, unjust enrichment, unfair
and deceptive business practices, invasion of privacy, and violation
of multiple state data breach laws.
257
Just as inWhalen and Beck, the
plaintiffs in Remijas filed suit based on “lost time and money
protecting themselves against future identity theft.”
258
In analyzing the plaintiffs’ standing, the court in Remijas turned
to the Clapper standard and looked to determine whether an injury
251
Beck, 848 F.3d at 276 n.8; Galaria, 663 F. App’x. 384, 388 (6th Cir.
2016).
252
Galaria, 663 F. App’x 384, 387–90.
253
Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90; Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 390.
254
SeeAttias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Remijas
v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
255
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 690–91.
258
Compare Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir.
2017), and Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017), with Remijas,
794 F.3d at 692.
186 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
in fact had occurred.
259
Just as in Whalen, the plaintiffs in Remijas
argued that they suffered lost time and money spent “replacing cards
and monitoring their credit score[s].”
260
Unlike in Beck, the Seventh
Circuit found that (1) the theft of personal information alone was not
too speculative to create a “substantial risk” of harm because of the
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that harm will occur, and (2)
plaintiffs did not have to wait for the harm to occur to have
standing.
261
This differs from the Fourth Circuit’s finding in Beck
that (1) the theft of an unencrypted laptop and pathology reports
containing personal information was too speculative to conclude the
thieves intended to use the information, and that (2) because no harm
occurred, the plaintiffs were not at risk of fraud or identity theft.
262
The court’s finding of an “injury in fact” in Remijas—where
fraudulent credit card charges were reimbursed
263
—also directly
contrasts with the Third Circuit’s finding in Whalen that an “injury
in fact” did not occur when fraudulent credit card charges were
reimbursed by the issuing credit card company.
264
This
inconsistency leaves plaintiffs involved in data breach litigation
increasingly uncertain as to whether they have standing until the
Supreme Court effectuates a uniform application of standing
doctrine.
IV. A SOLUTION TO THECIRCUIT SPLIT ONDATABREACH
LITIGATION—RISK OF FUTUREHARMCREATES STANDING
The status of standing in data breach litigation is currently split
into three branches, where: (1) risk of a future harm does not create
standing;
265
(2) risk of a future harm does create standing;
266
or (3)
259
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 409 (2013)).
260
Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90; Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692.
261
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410).
262
Beck, 848 F.3d at 275.
263
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97.
264
Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91.
265
See id. at 89; Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
266
Attias v. CareFirst Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 387–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Remijas,
794 F.3d at 661.
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a statutory violation creates standing regardless of whether harm
actually occurred.
267
Standing interpretation in data breach litigation
should be narrowed into the two branches that do not contradict each
other, such that: (1) risk of a future harm does create standing, and
(2) a statutory violation creates standing regardless of whether harm
actually occurred. Creation of this bifurcation where both theories
can coexist would enable more plaintiffs to seek a remedy for the
theft of their personal information. It would also encourage entities
that maintain sensitive information to increase security because they
would face more accountability as an increasing number of data
breach lawsuits would survive motions to dismiss and reach
judgments on the merits.
268
A. Justice and Accountability: Increased Risk of Future
Harm Creates Standing
The Second and Fourth Circuits’ interpretations that the risk of
future harm does not create standing
269
differs from the D.C.,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ understanding that the risk of
future harm may confer standing.
270
To reiterate, the standing
requirements, as articulated in Clapper, are that there be: (1) an
injury in fact, (2) redressability, and (3) a causal connection between
the injury in fact and the matter brought into court.
271
Interpreting
the standing doctrine to require only a “reasonable likelihood” that
information will be used for fraudulent purposes (as opposed to
267
See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2017).
268
See LEBLANC &KNIGHT, supra note 62, at 1.
269
See generally Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d
Cir. 2017) (noting that absent any evidence to indicate a plaintiff may “plausibly
face a threat of future [harm],” the plaintiff suffers no injury and thus cannot
satisfy the standing requirement); Beck, 848 F.3d at 272 (discussing how absent
any evidence that risk of future harm “was certainly impending,” plaintiffs cannot
satisfy the standing requirement).
270
Attias, 865 F.3d at 622 (finding that risk of future harm was not “too
speculative” to constitute an injury in fact to meet the standing requirement);
Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 385 (determining the plaintiffs had Article III standing
partially because such theft placed them at a continuing risk of harm); Remijas,
794 F.3d at 692 (holding that if an allegation of future harm is “certainly
impending,” the allegation may establish standing).
271
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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waiting for fraudulent activity to occur) satisfies the “actual or
imminent” prong, and in the same way, finding that taking measures
after falling victim to a data breach satisfies the “concrete and
particularized” prong would help resolve the conflicting opinions
among the circuits and give both victims and information-holding
entities predictability.
272
i. Injury in Fact
Many of these circuits arrived at differing conclusions because
of the competing analysis of what constitutes an injury in fact.
273
As
explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, an injury in fact is a
harm that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent,”
not “conjectural or hypothetical.”
274
Applied to the data breach
context, courts have proven unable to decide whether the theft of
personal information is an injury in fact or whether victims of a
breach must wait until that stolen information is used to their
detriment.
275
Data breach cases often involve harms that have not
yet occurred, and so the determination that the harms are “actual or
imminent” is generally established by a showing that there is a
substantial risk of injury to the plaintiffs.
276
a. “Actual or Imminent”
An alleged harm is “actual or imminent” if there is a substantial
risk that the harm will occur.
277
Courts should consider the
“reasonable likelihood” that the breached information will be used
for fraudulent purposes as opposed to waiting for victims to
experience fraudulent activity. It should not be necessary for
272
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409–10 (2013).
273
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2017); Attias, 865
F.3d at 629; Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90; Beck, 848 F.3d at 272; Galaria, 663 F.
App’x at 387–89.
274
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
275
Spinelli, supra note 37.
276
See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629; Beck, 848 F.3d at 276;Galaria, 663 F. App’x
at 388–89; Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015).
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Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 412 (2013).
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plaintiffs to demonstrate that the thief or hacker stole personal
information for the purposes of fraudulent activity to create a
substantial risk of harm; “why else would hackers break into a
store’s database and steal personal information?”
278
Additionally,
defendants offering to pay for credit monitoring services should be
considered an indication that a substantial risk of harm exists.
279
These interpretations of the “actual or imminent” prong of the injury
in fact analysis would create a uniform result that would reduce
barriers to recovery for legitimate injuries in fact.
280
If the Fourth Circuit in Beck followed this analysis, the court
likely would not have required the plaintiffs to indicate that the
thieves stole the unencrypted laptop and pathology reports for the
personal information within them because it would have recognized
that information is inherently valuable, creating an obvious target.
281
In applying the solution proposed in this Note, theft of patients’
personal information in cases like Beck
282
would create a reasonable
likelihood that the information would be used for fraudulent
purposes since it was taken by illegal means. Additionally, the
offering of one year of credit monitoring to victims of the breach
would be an indication that “a substantial risk” of fraudulent activity
exists.
283
If the proposed analysis were applied in Whalen, instead
of concluding the injuries suffered were not actual, the court could
have concluded that the plaintiffs incurred the actual injury of
monitoring fraudulent activity on accounts and being at risk of the
278
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
279
Martecchini, supra note 67, at 1492.
280
See id. (The author proposes an alternative framework to avoid
“inconsistent results depending on the court” and suggests that an improvement
to “the data-breach standing analysis is necessary.”).
281
See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) (requiring the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that hackers stole the laptop and pathology reports for
misuse of personal information).
282
Id.
283
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690–93 (7th Cir.
2015) (“At this stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have
shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach.”).
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future risk of identity fraud, as thieves often open new credit cards
without people’s knowledge.
284
b. “Concrete and Particularized”
An injury is considered “particularized” when it affects the
plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.”
285
There is little debate
that when a plaintiff’s personal information is stolen it directly
harms the plaintiff (as opposed to a third party or the public).
286
An
injury is considered “concrete” when it involves something “real”—
such as money—as opposed to something abstract.
287
In Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, the Supreme Court
considered the claim that the government’s failure to comply with
the Incompatibility Clause (which prohibits a person from
simultaneously holding offices in both the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government) would only affect the
“generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance” to
be abstract because the plaintiffs did not suffer a harm particular to
the action.
288
The actions individuals must take following a breach
of their personal information—such as purchasing credit-
monitoring services, replacing credit cards, monitoring financial
statements, ordering new checks, and buying identity theft
insurance—should qualify as a “concrete injury” if they are
sufficiently specific.
289
The interpretation of the “concrete” injury
requirement in Schlesinger that requires sufficiently specific actions
to be taken following a breach of personal information would have
likely been satisfied by the plaintiffs in Beck, as opposed to being
seen as an effort to mitigate future harm, when they obtained credit
284
SeeWhalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017);
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693–94 (A showing of “actual” injury must be made for the
purposes of Article III standing; the court noted that the mitigation expenses alone
did not qualify as actual injuries sufficient for standing.).
285
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992).
286
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
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Id. at 1548.
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(1974).
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monitoring software after the theft of their personal information.
290
Additionally, this likely would have created a “concrete” injury for
the plaintiff in Whalen had she provided specific expenses and
detailed the effort she underwent after the theft of her information
instead of being overly vague.
291
This analysis requiring simply that
an injury in fact not be vague likely would have enabled the court in
SuperValu to find standing regardless of whether a fraudulent
charge was incurred because the specific time and effort spent
protecting and monitoring the victims’ accounts likely would have
been sufficiently concrete.
292
In addition to a disregard of time,
effort, and expense as non-abstract, requiring plaintiffs to wait for
fraudulent activity is problematic and unjust because the more time
that passes between a data breach and an instance of identity theft,
the easier it is for the defendant to argue that the fraudulent activity
is not “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s data breach.
293
The
proposed standard is an application of standing doctrine that
adequately responds to the modern dilemma of data breaches.
c. Redressability and a Causal Connection
The next standing requirement—redressability—is easily
demonstrated under the suggested interpretation of the standing
doctrine. The “concrete” harm of purchasing credit-monitoring
services, replacing credit cards, monitoring financial statements,
ordering new checks, and buying identity theft insurance is
redressed by a favorable verdict that grants compensatory
damages.
294
The final requirement for standing—that the alleged
injuries be “fairly [ ] trace[able]” to the defendant
295
—does not
require that the defendant be the immediate cause of the data breach
(through inadequate security or another failure), only that the
290
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injuries be fairly traceable.
296
Courts have found that defendants
being one step removed from hackers still have a fairly traceable
connection to alleged injuries.
297
B. If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Standing Based on a
Statutory Violation
Congress’ power to create statutes and give individuals the
ability to enforce their individual rights is not a new concept but a
well-established practice related to the standing doctrine.
298
An
application of standing doctrine that finds standing based on a
statutory violation regardless of whether a harm has occurred does
not conflict with an analysis that considers a future harm an injury
in fact. Instead, it should be seen as an alternative for when the
alleged injuries are based on a statutory right.
299
This does not
require that an injury in fact be “actual or imminent” and “concrete
or particularized” because if a statutory right has been violated, an
injury in fact is present.
300
The Supreme Court has reasoned that the
violation of a statute creates an injury, a disregard for legislatively
created legal rights, that establishes standing, whether or not the
violation resulted in a monetary harm.
301
While the Supreme Court
has ruled that not all statutory violations automatically create
standing, unauthorized disclosures of information have been
interpreted to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.
302
Therefore, the
Third Circuit’s ruling in Horizon Healthcare is not contradictory to
an analysis that considers the risk of future harm an injury in fact
296
Id. at 560–61.
297
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298
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (“[T]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist
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standing.’” (citations omitted)).
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See id.
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Id. at 560, 578.
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but is instead a separate and reliable analysis for when statutory
rights are violated.
303
CONCLUSION
Interpreting standing doctrine to consider the risk of future harm
sufficient to establish standing would create a uniform application
of standing. Additionally, it would enable victims of data breaches
to obtain justice and encourage entities that hold personal
information to improve their security measures.
304
This uniform
application of standing doctrine is clearly necessary because of the
circuit split with regard to conferring standing between the
Second
305
and Fourth Circuits
306
and the D.C.,
307
Sixth,
308
Seventh,
309
Eighth,
310
and Ninth Circuits.
311
Additionally, as the
number of data breaches continues to increase, an interpretation of
standing doctrine where (1) the risk of a future harm creates standing
and (2) a statutory violation creates standing regardless of whether
harm actually occurred will allow plaintiffs to achieve a remedy for
the failure of others to safeguard their information.
312
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303
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in legal action should push entities to spend more money on data
protection because the increasing rate of data breach litigation
indicates such entities have not found the motivation elsewhere.
313
using future risk of harm and statutory violations to create standing will provide
plaintiffs with a valuable remedy).
313
LEBLANC & KNIGHT, supra note 62, at 4 (noting that “pre-breach
compliance” may prepare counsel for “increasingly inevitable post-breach
litigation”).
